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In the current polarized US political environment, what defines a “true American” is 
increasingly contested. Furthermore, the extent to which the a priori measures 
commonly employed to account for national identity – patriotism and nationalism – 
capture current understandings of American national identity is unknown. In a novel 
application of Q methodology, this study investigates the relationship between 
patriotism and nationalism measures and participants’ subjective understandings of 
their national identity. Forty-seven US citizens representing a wide range of 
ideological positions constructed American identity profiles by ranking 56 statements 
taken from patriotic and nationalistic operationalizations. The two extracted profiles 
revealed national identities largely along left/right ideological, not 
patriotism/nationalism, lines. Further analysis indicated that the political left and right 
also differently interpret items within patriotism and nationalism measures. These 
findings cast doubt on the ideological independence of patriotism and nationalism 
measures and whether they adequately reflect American national identity content.  
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“It’s not just a choice between parties or policies, the usual debates between left and 
right. This is a more fundamental choice—about who we are as a people…” 
(President Obama at the 2016 Democratic National Convention) 
 
 
In the wake of the 2016 US presidential election, pinning down who the 
American people are as a people, what they stand for, and what they believe is 
increasingly difficult. From the NFL “take a knee” protest to Donald Trump’s 
presidency itself, it is clear that how people understand what it means to be a “true 
American” varies widely. National identity is a powerful and ever-present social 
identity, and differences in how this identity is defined can have profound 
implications for political behavior (Billig, 1995; Tajfel, 1974; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). At a group level, these understandings have the 
potential to shape domestic and foreign policy (Lieven, 2004; O’Dwyer, Lyons, & 
Cohrs, 2016) and define the boundaries of the “imagined community” of a nation 
(Anderson, 1983). At an individual level, they can influence attitudes towards 
political policy, candidates and levels of civic participation. 
Ever since Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) called for a ‘sharp discrimination 
between patriotism and nationalism’ (p. 273), researchers have turned to measures of 
these constructs to describe the content and the consequences of American national 
identity. Patriotism is widely described as a ‘love of country’, a benign, positive, 
beneficial, and even necessary attachment to the nation (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, & Nevitt, 1950). Patriotism’s ‘evil twin’, nationalism, has been said to 
reflect an orientation to national superiority and dominance beyond a love of country 
(Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). It is perceived as a negative and even dangerous 
attachment, evident in its extreme in Nazi Germany, but also apparent in certain 
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present-day anti-immigration propaganda, and even in more subtle everyday symbols 
and interactions in the guise of patriotism (Billig, 1995).  
Scholars have sought to disentangle patriotic from nationalistic attitudes by 
conceptualising and measuring particular a priori dimensions of these phenomena, 
including affective (how an individual feels about their country) (De Figueiredo & 
Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), membership (who is considered a 
member of the nation) (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Theiss-Morse, 2009) and 
relational (the extent to which the fixed authority of the group is accepted) (Rothì, 
Lyons, & Chryssochoou, 2005; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999) aspects. Each of these 
dimensions has been parsed to produce measures that differentiate between patriotic 
and nationalistic attitudes. The contrast between measures of patriotic and 
nationalistic attitudes has been shown to predict attitudes towards ethnic minorities 
(Li & Brewer, 2004), nuclear armament (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) and 
immigration (Citrin, Johnston, & Wright, 2012), as well as behaviours such as 
political involvement (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz et al., 1999).  
No one measure is consensually accepted, however, and the terms patriotism, 
nationalism and national identity are used inconsistently and even conflated 
(Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Schildkraut, 2014; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Certain of 
the patriotism and nationalism conceptualisations have been criticised for their 
simplicity (Condor, 2001; Hopkins, 2001) and ideological conflation. Pride, 
chauvinism, symbolic patriotism, and blind patriotism have been found to be more 
common in conservatives (Billig, 1995; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kosterman & 
Feshbach, 1989), and constructive patriotism has been more often attributed to 
liberals (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Ideological conflation not only suggests that the 
political left and right think about their American national identity in different ways, 
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but conflation across a number of measures may indicate that ideology is the 
commonality underlying these operationalisations. Acknowledging the limitations of 
current operationalisations of patriotism and nationalism, some scholars have either 
expressed the need to elaborate on measures of national identity (Schildkraut, 2014) 
or proposed a more ideologically neutral measure of this identity by including a 
measure of identity strength (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; 
Theiss-Morse, 2009). Yet, the question remains as to the adequacy and independence 
of nationalism and patriotism measures over and above left/right political divides. 
Any effect of ideological conflation is likely to have only become more 
pronounced in the time since the initial conceptualisation of the primary patriotism 
and nationalism scales (Citrin et al., 1990; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Schatz et 
al., 1999). In this time, the political left and right have grown in their dislike of each 
other (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012) and ideological identity has become more 
aligned with other social identities such as race and religion, producing a greater 
likelihood of consistency of thought within the left and the right (Mason, 2018). This 
increasingly polarized political environment warrants a re-evaluation of a priori 
patriotism and nationalism measures in light of Americans’ current understandings of 
their national identity.  
The current study seeks to capture citizens’ self-understandings of American 
national identity, asking citizens across a wide ideological spectrum to relate current 
measures of patriotism and nationalism to their ideas of what makes one a ‘true 
American’. In doing so, we are able to simultaneously explore the interrelationships 
between American identity, ideology, and the various conceptualisations of patriotism 
and nationalism discussed in the following section. 
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Conceptualisations of Patriotism and Nationalism 
Affective:  Pride, chauvinism and symbolic patriotism. Affective 
attachment to one’s nation is primarily associated with the emotions of love and pride.  
While love of the nation is found equally across the political ideological spectrum, 
pride appears to manifest differently. De Figueirdo and Elkins (2003) analysed 
national pride based on the assertion that the central distinction between the concepts 
of patriotism and nationalism is their point of reference. National pride (patriotism) is 
self-referential, a positive regard for one’s country, while chauvinism (nationalism) 
stems from comparison between one’s own and other countries and is almost 
exclusively downward. Chauvinism has been associated with hostility to immigrants 
(De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003) and negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities 
(Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016). Survey items related to pride and chauvinism 
(along with ethno-cultural patriotism, discussed below) are included in the national 
General Social Survey and are therefore commonly used in American national 
identity research. 
Symbolic patriotism taps an individual’s affective attachment to the nation and 
its core values through symbols (Parker, 2010). In the US, primary symbols 
associated with national identity include the national anthem, the American flag and 
the Pledge of Allegiance. Whether symbolic patriotism contributes to patriotism as 
well as nationalism is a matter of debate. On one hand, attachment to national 
symbols have been associated with nationalism in certain correlational (Schatz & 
Lavine, 2007; Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz, 1992), and experimental (Kemmelmeier & 
Winter, 2008) studies; but others have found evidence for a patriotic attachment, 
defined as support for free speech (Parker, 2010) and racial tolerance (DeLamater, 
Katz, & Kelman, 1969).   
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Membership:  ethno-cultural, civic creedal, and civic republican. The 
most widely discussed conceptualisation of American national identity surrounds 
whether the way in which Americans define membership for their in-group is ethno-
cultural (on the basis of the common heritage) or civic (on the basis of having a 
common purpose and shared goals) (Citrin et al., 1990; Li & Brewer, 2004; Smith, 
1988).  Civic membership requires only that a person espouse certain values or 
behave in a certain way; such membership may theoretically be acquired by anyone, 
and is therefore seen as patriotic. Alternatively, the endorsement of ethno-cultural 
membership norms indicates a nationalistic perspective.   
As a ‘new nation’ America’s national identity has historically been considered 
to be bound, not by a shared history or ethnicity (ethno-cultural membership), but by 
the ‘American Creed’, an agreed understanding of the ideals of freedom, democracy, 
individualism and equality of opportunity (Citrin et al., 1990; Huntington, 2004). The 
purity of this civic creedal basis of national identification has been challenged in 
recent years as certain of the creedal values (e.g. individualism) can be increasingly 
seen as ethno-cultural (Huntington, 2004; Lieven, 2004).  Throughout the country’s 
history, America and America’s immigrants have primarily been ethno-culturally 
Anglo-Protestant, a culture and belief system that informed the values and 
constitution on which the country was founded and upon which civic membership is 
based (Huntington, 2004; Smith, 1988). This national identity has met with growing 
challenges from an increase in non-European immigrants and birth rates and the rise 
in popularity of the ideas of multiculturalism and diversity (Huntington, 2004). These 
influences affect and make salient both America’s ethno-cultural and creedal bases of 
identity and have been the basis of much conjecture as to the impact on the future of 
American identity and democracy (Huntington, 2004; Lieven, 2004; Smith, 1988). 
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The ethno-cultural/civic conceptualisation has been criticized for its lack of 
dichotomy. Not only are creedal values bound with Anglo-Protestant ethno-cultural 
values, but scholars now agree that American identity includes both civic and ethno-
cultural norms (Schildkraut, 2014). Indeed, recent work has concluded that only about 
half of the American population can be described as having either an ethno-cultural or 
a civic attachment to the nation, strongly suggesting that this conceptualisation is a 
significantly limited descriptor of national identity (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016). 
The civic norms of national identity may also include behavioural elements:  it 
has been argued that both academic and popular concepts of American identity are 
shaped by the responsibilities of membership in the political community (civic 
republicanism) (Schildkraut, 2014). Civic republicanism requires that the polity not 
only be informed about and involved in public life, but also act in the best interest of 
the community rather than in self-interest (Smith, 1988). Civic participation is an 
important element of national identity in democratic countries; it is seen as the 
behaviour of a ‘good’ citizen (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2004). Alternatively, Bar-
Tal (2000) uses the active involvement of civic republicanism not to distinguish 
between nationalism and patriotism, but to separate passive and active forms of 
patriotism, thereby excluding civic republicanism as a necessary element of 
patriotism. 
Relational:  blind or constructive. In contrast to most collective identities, 
national identity has inherent in it an authority (the government) that can make legal 
demands of its members. The way in which individuals perceive their relationship 
with this authority has offered yet another contrast between patriotism and 
nationalism. 
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Nationalism has been described as blind patriotism, characterised by an 
intolerance of criticism and an unquestioning positive evaluation of, and staunch 
allegiance to, one’s own nation. Blind patriotism is juxtaposed with constructive 
patriotism which manifests as the questioning and criticism of current group practices 
with an intent to bring about positive change (Schatz et al., 1999). Although there is a 
shared ideology between blind and ethno-cultural patriotism as well as between 
constructive and civic patriotism, Rothi, Lyons and Chryssochoou (2005) found 
support for the orthongonality of each of the bilateral conceptualisations in a study of 
British students and have asserted the importance of looking at all four components 
when assessing national attachment. In addition, Parker (2010) found support for 
separately assessing blind patriotism and symbolic patriotism.  
The Current Study 
The current study presents a novel approach to re-evaluating academic 
measures of patriotism and nationalism as the underlying constructs of American 
national identity. We have employed Q-methodology, a mixed-methods approach 
specifically aimed at the study of subjective topics; it identifies distinct groups of 
individuals with similar representations. The approach is particularly appropriate for 
subjective and self-referent topics such as political opinion (Brown, 1980) in that it is 
through a tendency to share viewpoints that political opinion is constructed. It also 
allows us to identify patterns in the profiles of these groups of individuals, such as 
ideology. Whereas survey-based studies of national identity have primarily focused 
on a priori, unidimensional conceptualisations of patriotism and nationalism, Q-
methodology will allow us to gain an understanding of national identity from the 
participants’ perspective and simultaneously explore the interrelationships of eight 
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conceptualisations: pride, chauvinism, symbolic patriotism, ethno-cultural, civic 
creedal, civic republicanism, blind patriotism, and constructive patriotism.  
Participants in this study constructed a representation of American national 
identity from current academic conceptualisations of patriotism and nationalism. By 
using these measures as the source material from which participants are asked to 
construct their interpretations, this study not only simultaneously considers these 
conceptualisations and how they relate to differing perspectives on American identity, 
but also addresses the degree to which various current academic conceptualisations of 
nationalism and patriotism account for these interpretations. If patriotism and 
nationalism as currently conceived are important differentiators in American identity, 
we would expect to extract at least one factor that is distinguished from another by the 
endorsement of nationalistic statements (comprised of ethno-cultural, chauvinistic, 
blind patriotism [and possibly symbolic patriotism] norms). Alternatively, factors that 
are divided along ideological lines would suggest that such distinctions are integral to 
differing perspectives of American identity. Based on previous literature, we would 
also expect to see consensus across all civic creedal values. In this way, the study uses 
social psychological constructs to understand participants’ perspectives on national 
identity, and at the same time employs participants’ constructions of national identity 
to evaluate these social psychological measures.  
Method 
Design 
Q-methodology (“Q”) has been selected to identify meanings that laypersons 
attribute to their national identity. Q is a method of data collection and analysis aimed 
at exploring alternative conceptualisations of multi-dimensional topics amongst a 
broad spectrum of participants, allowing for the systematic study of subjectivity. Q 
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has been identified as a research methodology “capable of identifying the currently 
predominant social viewpoints and knowledge structures relative to a chosen subject 
matter” (Watts & Stenner, 2012, p. 42). The use of Q in political science was 
promoted by Brown (1980) and has since been used to investigate such various 
political topics as conceptualisations of good citizenship (Theiss-Morse, 1993), the 
meaning of ideological labels (Zechmeister, 2006) and democratic support profiles 
(Carlin, 2018).     
In its most basic form, Q can be understood as an adaptation of factor analysis.  
Unlike R-methodology (by-variable) factor analysis, which seeks to group variables 
that may be alternative manifestations of an underlying factor, Q (by-person) factor 
analysis seeks to group participants who hold a common point of view. Q also differs 
in the derivation of the data subject to analysis. In R-methodology, data is derived 
from participants who have been subjected to a collection of tests; Q data is derived 
when certain items are ranked by a collection of individuals.  
In Q, participants perform a ranking exercise called a “Q sort”. Ranking, as 
compared to Likert scales, has been found to better differentiate between attitudes 
regarding national identity (Wright, Citrin, & Wand, 2012). Participants are presented 
with a set of opinion statements about a topic and asked to rank them (usually from 
agree most to disagree most). These rankings are then subject to factor analysis; the 
resulting factors represent areas of subjective agreement. Q detects statements that 
particularly distinguish each point of view from the others (Sullivan et al., 1992) and 
captures the interdependence of opinions: a respondent’s evaluation of any one 
statement only makes sense in the context of their reactions to every other statement 
in the set. In addition, participants are invited to comment on their rankings. This 
qualitative data allows researchers to more accurately understand how participants 
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interpreted the Q-set statements. Q explanatory power is limited in that the statements 
provided by the researcher limit the participants’ representations of American national 
identity; this analysis may therefore not have identified a full range of statements to 
reflect national identity content. To help mitigate this limitation, participants were 
asked in an open question to comment on the completeness of the statement set.  
Participants 
Q typically uses fairly small, diverse, and non-random groups of subjects. The 
studies aim to collect a diversity of heterogeneous perspectives on a subject, but do 
not require a large or representative sample (Watts & Stenner, 2005). Forty-seven 
participants were recruited who, based on their ideological identity, their geography 
and their age, were likely to hold divergent perspectives about the content of 
American identity. To encourage participation by those who may not necessarily be 
politically interested, participants were entered in a draw for a $100 amazon.com gift 
voucher. 
Aiming to achieve a broad ideological distribution, the first author tapped a 
personal network of contacts across a wide geographical, ideological, and 
generational spread. Potential participants were approached via e-mail; approximately 
90 per cent of those approached completed the study. Data was collected in February 
2017. The participant group comprised 21 males and 26 females; 22 voted for Hillary 
Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, 21 for Donald Trump, two for a third-party 
candidate, and two didn’t vote; 16 were Democrats, 11 were Independents, two were 
Libertarians, and 18 were Republicans. Nine considered themselves to be of moderate 
political ideology, 19 were liberals, and the remaining 19 were conservatives.  
Participants were aged between 36 and 75 (M = 53.57, SD = 11.91) and were 
residents of 14 different states and the District of Columbia. Two of the participants 
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were Hispanic, while the remaining 45 were white. The questionnaires were 
completed on-line using POET-Q on-line Q-sort software (Jeffares, 2016).  
Procedure and Materials 
Q-set.  A Q-sort is required to be sampled from the same type of source (e.g. 
speech, literature, or other source), represent a balanced account of the concept in 
question, and be comprised of only subjective (not factual) statements (Stephenson, 
1953). The Q-sort statements for the current study reflect conceptualisations of 
patriotism and nationalism as identified in the literature: affective (pride, chauvinism 
and symbolic patriotism), criteria for in-group membership (ethno-cultural, civic 
creedal and civic republican patriotism) and relational (blind and constructive 
patriotism). These perspectives were balanced by selecting 56 statements from current 
measures of patriotism and nationalism: seven statements reflecting each of the eight 
different conceptualisations discussed in this article’s introduction (Brown, 1993). 
Statements for each conceptualisation were sourced as follows: pride (De Figueiredo 
& Elkins, 2003), chauvinism (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 
1989), symbolic (‘AEI Public Opinion Study’, 2016; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; 
Huddy & Khatib, 2007), ethno-cultural (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Citrin et al., 
1990; Rothì et al., 2005), civic creedal (Citrin et al., 1990; Rothì et al., 2005; Wright 
et al., 2012), civic republican (‘AEI Public Opinion Study’, 2016; Citrin et al., 1990), 
blind (Schatz et al., 1999), and constructive (Rothì et al., 2005; Schatz et al., 1999). 
Prior to data collection, statements were reviewed by American laypersons to ensure 
non-redundancy and completeness.   
Q-sorting. Using POET-Q, participants were asked to first sort the provided 
statements into categories of “agree more”, “agree less”, and “neutral”.  One 
statement was provided at a time:  the first statement from each conceptualisation, 
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followed by the second from each, and so on. The participant was then asked to 
construct a distribution grid by rank-ordering the statements in each category within 
an 11-point forced distribution (Figure 1).   
[Insert Figure 1] 
Within POET-Q, participants constructed the grid by first selecting the most 
agreeable statements and most disagreeable statements (the exact number depended 
on the quantity of statements in each “agree more”, “neutral”, and “agree less” 
category). This process was repeated until the grid was complete. Once the grid was 
constructed, participants had the opportunity to view and edit the grid to their 
satisfaction. This grid then represented the individual’s unique subjective assessment 
of the content of American identity based on the statements provided. Finally, 
participants were asked to comment on their sort: general comments on the set as well 
as specific comments on the two most agreeable and the two most disagreeable 
statements. Prior to the Q-sort, participants were asked to provide demographic 
information to assess the ideological distribution of the sample and to assist with 
factor interpretation.   
Findings 
Factor Analysis 
A principal component analysis of the Q-sorts was completed using the 
PQMethod software package (Schmolck, 2014). This analysis revealed six un-rotated 
factors with an eigenvalue of greater than 1.0. Varimax rotations of two, three, four, 
five and six (Brown, 1980) factors produced a loading of two or fewer participants on 
factors 4, 5 and 6; lacking consistency of composition under various rotations and 
coherent ‘shared views’, these factors were eliminated. Based on review of the scree 
plot and of the participant profiles loaded on each of the remaining three factors, only 
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Factors 1 and 2 were considered to represent distinct and coherent points of view.  As 
recommended by Watts and Stenner (2012), both Varimax and manual rotation were 
used to arrive at a solution that maximised the number of participants included in the 
two factors. Varimax rotation was performed for two factors with an additional 10 
degree manual rotation to arrive at the final factor loadings. Although the significance 
level for loading was calculated to be .34 (p < 0.01), the factors were highly 
correlated (r = .75). This high correlation was expected as a number of the statements 
employed are known to have a high degree of acceptance (e.g. "equal treatment", 
Citrin et al., 1990) or rejection (e.g. "would support the US, right or wrong", 
Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016) as part of American identity. A higher level of 
significance (.55) was therefore selected for participant profile retention to minimize 
confounding (participants loading significantly on both factors) while maximizing the 
number of loadings on each factor (Watts & Stenner, 2012). Using these criteria, 21 
participants loaded on Factor 1 and 21 participants loaded on Factor 2; three 
participants did not load significantly on either factor, and two were confounded.  
The retained participant profiles for each factor are merged on a weighted 
average basis to arrive at an idealized Q-sort referred to as a factor array, found in 
Table 1. These factor arrays, with identifying z-scores and Q-sort rankings (a 
translation of z-scores into the 11-point forced distribution), reflect the shared 
viewpoint for each factor and are central to factor interpretation. The two profiles of 
American identity reveal the norms that each set of participants holds or rejects and 
the items that discriminate between the profiles.    
[Insert Table 1] 
Of the 56 statements, 35 were consensus statements (the difference between z-
scores was < 0.55), indicating a high level of agreement between the factors as to the 
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norms that comprise American identity—and those that do not. Twenty of the 
consensual statements supported the position that nationalistic norms—blind 
patriotism (all consensual), chauvinism (all consensual) and ethno-cultural (6 of 7 
consensual)—were not important elements of American identity (all negative z-
scores). Only one statement (A true American speaks English) from the nationalistic 
measures distinguished between profiles of American identity. The contested concept 
of symbolic patriotism included two consensus statements, while the other five 
distinguished between the two factors. 
There was also general agreement that the patriotic conceptualisations were 
important elements of American identity (had positive to neutral z-scores).  However, 
which of these conceptualisations and their component statements were important to 
the identity differed significantly between factors. There was more agreement 
regarding civic creedal and republican values (both, 5 of 7 statements consensual), but 
the importance of constructive patriotism (all 7 distinguishing) and the affective 
norms of pride (4 of 7 statements distinguishing) and symbolic patriotism (5 of 7 
statements distinguishing) differed significantly. 
There was a clear difference in how the identified factors used the measures of 
patriotism to structure their representations of American identity. Factor 1 prioritized 
constructive patriotism and equality, while Factor 2 indicated that creedal values, 
symbolic reverence and pride were most important. Differences in motivations and 
demonstrations of affect towards the nation were also identified. In the following 
section, each viewpoint is holistically interpreted in the context of patriotism and 
nationalism conceptualizations. The interpretation uses factor arrays, distinguishing 
and consensus statements (Q-set statements are indicated in italics), direct quotes 
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from participants’ comments on their rankings, and the average and range of z-scores 
for the conceptualizations of patriotism and nationalism (Table 2). 
Factor Interpretations 
[Insert Table 2] 
Factor 1: For the People.  Factor 1 had 21 defining Q-sorts with loadings 
between .60 and .82 and explained 31 percent of the variance. All participants loading 
on Factor 1 (seven males and 14 females) voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 
presidential election; 16 were Democrats and five were Independents. Four 
considered themselves to be of moderate political ideology, while the remaining 17 
were liberals (four classifying themselves as “strong liberals”). Participants loading 
on this factor were aged between 36 and 75 (M = 55.48, SD = 13.45) and were 
residents of 10 different states and the District of Columbia. 
The Factor 1 representation reflected support for active and critical 
involvement in the political process motivated by a desire for greater equality. A 
distinctive feature was a high level of agreement with constructive patriotism, civic 
republican, and civic creedal values. All seven constructive patriotism items were 
distinguishing statements (z-score ranged from 1.08 to 1.54, average = 1.30). The 
right to disagree with one’s government was a primary value and obligation for Factor 
1 as reflected in participants’ comments including “I love my country primarily 
because I have the right to criticize it”, “dissent is the most important freedom we 
have”, and “it is our right and our duty”. Criticism was a demonstration of affection: 
“when you take the time to question policy decisions, it shows you care”. Six of the 
seven civic republican statements were supported (average z-score = 0.67), suggesting 
an endorsement of active involvement generally.   
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This active political involvement appears to be related to the desire to progress 
towards greater equality, inclusion, and a “just society”. The two statements that 
received the highest level of agreement were the creedal values of equality 
(statements 50 and 10). “We are all created equal” was a frequently cited 
representation in participant comments as was “with liberty and justice for all”, while 
change for the country was seen as necessary for “growth”, “to evolve”, for 
“progress” and to “remain strong”. The average z-score for civic creedal values as a 
whole was 1.03, attesting to the importance of this conceptualisation to Factor 1. The 
z-score range was wide however; agreement ranged from a high level of support for 
equality values to a more neutral endorsement of individualism (statement 2) and free 
enterprise (statement 34), both distinguishing statements. By treating each creedal 
statement as varying in importance, Factor 1 suggests that these values are not seen as 
a unitary “American Creed”.   
The neutral ground of the factor array was primarily populated by statements 
related to pride (average z-score = 0.24) and symbolic patriotism (average z-score =    
-0.47). The highest rated pride statement was …proud of America’s fair and equal 
treatment (statement 30) at 0.84; while …proud to be an American (statement 6) was 
ranked lower at 0.20. Some questioned the very idea of taking pride in one’s national 
identity: “pride is something that u accomplish, like having a good marrage [sic] or 
raising great children.  im proud of that but im not proud to be an American but im 
happy and thankful that i am”, suggesting a clear distinction between the individual 
and the nation. 
Overall, Factor 1 comments suggested a perspective motivated by the desire 
for the government to provide greater equality for its citizens. Active involvement and 
change were endorsed through constructive patriotism and civic republicanism 
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statements. Evinced by the large z-score range, civic creedal values, however, were 
not considered to be unitarily relevant to American identity by Factor 1. 
Factor 2: For the Nation.  Factor 2 had 21 defining Q-sorts (with loadings 
between .56 and .81) and explained 34 percent of the variance. In the 2016 
presidential election, the participants loading on Factor 2 (11 males and 10 females) 
voted for Donald Trump (16), Hillary Clinton (one), a third-party candidate (two) or 
didn’t vote (two). Fifteen of the Factor 2 participants were Republicans (six of whom 
identified as “strong” Republicans), two were Libertarians, and four identified as 
Independents; two considered themselves to be of moderate political ideology, two 
were moderate liberals, and the remaining 17 were conservatives (5 classifying 
themselves as “strong conservatives”). The ages of participants loading on this factor 
ranged from 40 to 67 (M = 52.15, SD = 9.15) and participants were residents of seven 
different states. 
The Factor 2 representation was primarily defined by strong agreement with 
civic creedal values, pride, and symbolic patriotism. There was a high level of 
agreement with all civic creedal values (average z-score = 1.24, range = 0.59). The 
factor array indicated agreement with the values of rule by the people (statement 18), 
equality (statements 10 and 50) and free enterprise (statement 34). However, in the 
ranking and interpretation of equality statements, Factor 2 (z-scores of 1.32 and 1.30) 
differed significantly from Factor 1 (1.68 and 1.72). The comments by Factor 2 
participants revealed an interpretation that spoke less to the Factor 1 ideas of “justice” 
and “all are created equal”, but instead to the more utilitarian and individualistic idea 
that “equal rights allow all Americans the opportunity to succeed” and “the right to 
live the American Dream”.  The value of a free market was linked to this equal 
opportunity; free enterprise “drives the creation of jobs and equal opportunity” and 
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“provides the opportunity for citizens to reap what they sow”. The American Dream, 
the achievement of “your own potential and life goals”, was considered to be 
dependent not only on equal opportunity, but also upon individualism (statement 2, z-
score = 0.98). Independence and self-reliance were seen to “define the American 
character” and were identified as “what makes America stand apart from other 
countries”. Comments supporting the value of treating all backgrounds equally 
(statement 10) noted that it was a “founding principle”; while some participants noted 
that it pertains to “those that have assimilated”, “who are not a threat to me or my 
family”, or “who love America”, indicating a qualified acceptance of this creedal 
value.  
For Factor 2, symbolic patriotism statements were the second highest agreed 
upon set of norms with an average z-score of 0.85. Although the range of z-scores of 
1.28 was wider than Factor 1’s range of 0.71, the disparity is primarily due to the 
difference in each factor’s top symbolic patriotism rating: pride in the armed forces 
(statement 56, z-score of 0.23 for Factor 1 and 1.60 for Factor 2 – a difference in z-
score of 1.37). America’s armed forces were seen by Factor 2 as the defender of 
freedom: “our country and our Constitution and all of the freedoms we enjoy would 
not exist were it not for the sacrifices of our armed forces”. The disparity in the 
factors’ ranking of this single item points to the possibility of an ideological 
conflation with the traditional conservative support for national defence.   
Beyond those symbols of the armed forces, flag, national anthem and Pledge 
of Allegiance included in the Q-set, additional symbolic representations emerged in 
the participant comments. A number of Factor 2 participant comments referred to the 
Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and “founding fathers” when 
supporting their rankings. There was a clear reverence for the foundation of America, 
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reflected in statements such as “our government institutions were carefully crafted 
over 200 years ago” and “our country had very intelligent founders”. Although 
previous research has connected symbolic patriotism with “externalizing one’s core 
values” (Parker, 2010, p. 101), these symbols, considerably less available for 
externalizing than those included in the Q-set, are still clearly important to Factor 2, 
indicating an attachment to symbols beyond the need to externalise. 
Although the statements based on national pride were third in the overall 
conceptual rankings for Factor 2 (average z-score = 0.54), the overall highest-ranking 
statement in the Factor 2 factor array is … proud to be an American (statement 6).  
The average z-score for the measure of pride differed only by 0.30 between the 
factors, but the z-score range of rankings for pride items in Factor 1 (0.84) was far 
smaller than the range for Factor 2 (2.52). For Factor 2, there appeared to be three 
distinct sources of pride:  pride in the construct of the nation (statements 6 and 14, z-
scores of 1.60 and 1.13); pride in the country’s achievements in science, history, equal 
treatment and economy (z-scores = 0.25 - 0.67); and pride in America’s social 
security system (z-score = -0.92). This single item outlier, pride in the social security 
system, like pride in the armed forces, is suggestive of an item which is conflated with 
ideology. 
Factor 2’s high ranking of pride in the nation indicates that national pride was 
not only identified as an important norm, but it was also considered to be separate 
from – and superior to – pride in the nation’s achievements. In contrast, Factor 1 
participants sorted all pride items in the middle of the factor array, indicating little 
differentiation between the nation itself and its peoples’ achievements. There may 
therefore exist a difference in each factor’s definition of the nation, the object with 
which they identify and to which they direct their affection. The importance of 
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affection for the nation is also reflected in the observation that Factor 2’s endorsement 
of both pride and chauvinism was higher than Factor 1’s. The key difference between 
the two factors was not the disparity between pride and chauvinism, but instead a 
difference between the level of affection for the nation generally, consistent with 
Billig’s (1995) criticism of Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) measure.  
Constructive patriotism is another conceptualisation that, according to Factor 
2, is not unitary (range of z-scores = 1.54). Factor 2 participants agreed with the more 
oblique statements related to “positive change” and “moving the country in a positive 
direction” (z-scores of 0.67 and 0.78, respectively) and were relatively neutral on 
questioning policy decisions and government actions (0.11 and 0.38), but they 
disagreed that this criticism was done for the good of, or out of love for, the country 
(z-scores ranged of -0.53 and -0.86). This segmentation by Factor 2 indicates that, for 
these participants, moving the country forward does not necessarily require criticism.  
And when criticism is necessary, it is not done out of affection. The narrow range of 
constructive patriotism scores for Factor 1, on the other hand, points to the perceived 
unity of criticism, progress and affection for the nation. How one expresses love of 
country was therefore markedly different between Factors 1 and 2. Conversely, 
statements that were consensual may have been agreed with for different reasons. For 
example, a Factor 2 participant’s comments referred to “anchor babies” (who would 
meet the ‘born in the US’ membership criteria) and needing to go through the 
required path to citizenship (illegal immigrants may have lived in their US for most of 
their lives). Therefore, the low ranking of these particular ethno-cultural statements 
may not necessarily reflect the rejection of an ethno-cultural understanding of 
American identity, as is commonly interpreted.   
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The operationalisations of the chauvinism and ethno-cultural 
conceptualisations also appeared to also be combining what, for Factor 2, were 
dissimilar norms.  Factor 2 discriminated between ethno- and cultural norms as well 
as between the “feeling” of being a better country and the desire to demonstrate 
superiority or influence, the latter reflecting the importance of affect for Factor 2, and 
again separating the nation from its actions.   
Discussion 
The contrast between nationalism and patriotism measures did not 
significantly differentiate between perspectives on American identity. Instead, the two 
identified factors were split broadly along political ideological lines, distinguished 
primarily by the contrast in how they differently prioritized the constructs of 
patriotism within the structure of their identities. The factors were further divided as 
to how coherent they perceived the measures of patriotism and nationalism to be.  
The limited role that current definitions of the patriotism/nationalism 
dichotomy played in this study’s factor interpretations highlights the descriptive 
limitations of these concepts. Nationalism, as currently defined, did not significantly 
differentiate the two factors, but was consensually dismissed as being unimportant to 
American identity. It was instead differences in the particularities of patriotism that 
defined the two factors. For example, civic and ethno-cultural norms did not 
differentiate the factors, but how civic values and responsibilities were prioritised and 
interpreted by each factor did. The split in presidential candidate support between the 
two factors is another indicator that—although widely referred to a nationalist 
victory—it was not nationalism as currently defined that would have predicted the 
2016 US presidential election results.  
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Two qualitatively distinct viewpoints on American identity were identified.  
The first was a view that greater protection and support of the equal rights of citizens 
is necessary—an objective that is to be achieved through a critical relationship with 
government, through whom this equality will be achieved. A second viewpoint 
reflected a more central psychological and classically affective attachment to the 
concept of the nation and its symbols, as well as a desire to return to America’s 
founding values from which the country has strayed too far – values that were seen to 
support a system that allows everyone a chance at success. Each factor’s 
representation appeared to be underpinned by motivational content, each with their 
own primary goal: to spread equality (Factor 1) and to maintain founding values 
(Factor 2). These factors’ characteristics are broadly in line with noted differences 
between liberals and conservatives such as advocating/resisting social change and 
acceptance/rejection of inequality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003); they 
are also congruent with Webster and Abramowitz's (2017) finding that social welfare 
issues are now the significant dividing line between parties.   
The interrelationship between creedal values, pride, and symbolic patriotism 
as well as between constructive patriotism and the value of equality, suggests that 
certain of these conceptualisations are measuring different aspects of an underlying 
construct. The finding that the factors were distinguished by their level of support for 
constructive and symbolic patriotisms resonates with certain elements of earlier 
national identity research. The inverse relationship found in this study between 
support for symbols and support for constructive patriotism is in line with Sullivan et 
al.’s (1992) Q-methodological study. That study’s iconoclastic patriotism factor (in 
contrast to its symbolic patriotism factor) rejected symbols, was motivated by 
economic justice and saw the related critical and active political engagement as 
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patriotic. Although Sullivan et al.’s Q-set was drawn from a different source 
(contemporary political discourse) and sought to explore patriotism (not national 
identity) these factors closely mirror the factors found in the current study, an 
indication of the existence of persistent profiles regardless of source material. Factors 
1 and 2 also bear a close resemblance to the two types of attachment identified by 
DeLamater et al. (1969) and further developed by Kelman (1997). DeLamater et al. 
defined national attachment according to an individual’s functional or symbolic role 
relationship with the nation. DeLamater and colleagues’ functionally committed 
individual defines their role according to political and social responsibilities and 
shows low affect for national symbols; while a symbolically integrated individual has 
a strong affective attachment to the nation and its values and gives a high priority to 
his or her role as an American. Kelman continued this line of reasoning, 
distinguishing between sentimental and instrumental motivations for an individual’s 
loyalty to the nation. According to this theory, and in keeping with the social identity 
framework (Tajfel, 1974; Turner et al., 1987), individuals who are sentimentally 
attached see the nation as a representative of their personal identity and are motivated 
to protect the group’s traditions and defining values (similar to Factor 2). Those who 
are motivated by an instrumental attachment perceive the purpose of the nation as 
meeting the needs and interests of the individual and those of fellow citizens (like 
Factor 1). This attachment that differs between the nation in the abstract (Factor 2) 
and the nation as people (Factor 1) is also in line with our findings. 
An underlying ideological national attachment is congruent with the 
endorsement of certain patriotism and nationalism constructs. For example, an 
endorsement of criticism (constructive patriotism) may be seen as being synonymous 
with the liberal position that government needs to “do more”, in line with the Factor 1 
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outlook, while “doing less” is in keeping with Factor 2’s emphasis on smaller 
government and individualism. Likewise, “moving forward” may require an 
instrumental relationship with one’s government, while “getting back” to revered 
values may reflect a sentimental attachment. The identification of differing motives 
for national attachment may also offer explanation for previously identified 
relationships between current measures of patriotism and nationalism and political 
behaviour. For example, constructive patriotism has been linked to political 
participation and interest without clear explanation (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz et 
al., 1999). The current study’s findings suggest that those who score highly on a 
constructive patriotism scale may also be committed to increasing social justice 
through government intervention. Such a motivation would be expected to require 
political participation and interest, thereby offering an explanation for the association.  
Equally, the findings lend themselves to other avenues of potential explanation for 
civil disobedience including a lack of reverence for the nation’s symbols and creed.  
This intertwining, along with the differing conceptualisations endorsed by liberals and 
non-liberals, suggests that certain current measures of patriotism and nationalism are 
conflated with political ideology. 
Not only did Factors 1 and 2 differently prioritize the conceptualisations of 
patriotism and nationalism as currently operationalised (based on average z-scores, 
and discussed above), but there was also a disparity in the interpretation of these 
operationalised statements and conceptualisations (based on the range of each 
conceptualisation’s z-scores and qualitative comments). With the notable exception of 
civic creedal values described below, Factor 1 appeared to agree with the academic 
operationalisations of these conceptualisations, while Factor 2 found more 
discontinuity. The findings provide insight into the subjective interpretations of 
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current operationalisations of patriotism/nationalism while also pointing to their 
weaknesses of ideological influence and lack of granularity. 
As evidence of the stability of the American political system, political studies 
often point to the widespread consensus on the American Creed. In their seminal 1990 
study, Citrin and colleagues found ideological consensus on the endorsement of the 
principle of equal treatment—a result they described as “striking” (Citrin et al., 1990, 
p. 1134). In line with Citrin et al.’s finding, the current study found that this creedal 
norm was endorsed across the ideological divide. However, the differing rankings and 
interpretations of equal treatment by Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggest that such a 
consensus may be more superficial than previously assumed – there may be a 
significant ideological divide in what previous literature has considered a consensus 
belief and a core American value. The differing interpretations of equality also offer 
alternative explanations for seemingly incongruous results in previous literature.  
Studies have observed a lack of connection between endorsement of the value of 
‘equal opportunity’ and policies such as affirmative action (Theiss-Morse, 2009).  
This disconnect was hypothesised to be due to an individual’s application of a creedal 
value other than equal opportunity (namely, individualism) to their policy preference.  
The current study suggests that the perceived incongruence between value 
endorsement and policy opinion—as well as the ideological consensus identified in 
Citrin’s study—may be explained by a difference in the interpretation of the equality 
values. For Factor 1, the motivation to see “justice for all” connects directly to the 
endorsement of governmental programs such as affirmative action; while for Factor 2, 
no such government intervention may be required if equality is provided by the nature 
of the American free economy and the absence of interpersonal bias.   
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This study identified a number of sub-components of current 
conceptualisations that were identified by Factor 2 but not Factor 1. These included:   
pride in the nation in the abstract, pride in the nation’s accomplishments, the feeling 
of as opposed to the act of superiority, and the act of criticism for the purpose of 
progress as distinguished from the act of criticism as a demonstration of love. The 
study also revealed the extent and the nature of the affective content of Factor 2’s 
attachment. How Factor 1 and Factor 2 express affection for their country differs, and 
symbols of the country are important to non-liberals beyond a need to ‘externalize’.  
The pronounced difference in the relationship with symbols between the factors 
indicates that the nature of attachment to representations of the country may be a rich 
area for further national attachment study. Research related to symbolic patriotism has 
primarily focused on the flag and the anthem (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Parker, 2010; 
Schatz & Lavine, 2007), but little work has explored the significance of non-
externalising symbols (e.g. the founding fathers, the Constitution) to this concept.  
The measures appear to warrant further granulation if non-liberal attitudes and 
perceptions are to be accurately captured. For example, additional insight may be 
gained if pride in the construct of the country and pride in the actions of the country, 
ethnic norms and cultural norms, and belief in the superiority of the country and 
support for international intervention were all separately measured. The awareness of 
these differences and of the areas of consensus identified in this study may offer 
opportunities for negotiation and compromise in the increasingly polarised political 
US environment.   
Assuming that the split between Factors 1 and 2 is broadly ideological, the 
clarity of Factor 1’s perception of the operationalisations compared to the fractured 
rankings found in Factor 2 indicates that liberal ideology may be more accurately 
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reflected in the current social psychological measures of patriotism and nationalism. 
The potential for embedding liberal values in social psychological theory and 
operationalisations is a recognized issue (Duarte et al., 2015). The concept of 
nationalism may also be particularly prone to the tendency of liberal academics to 
construct theories that explain conservative attitudes (Brandt & Spalti, 2017): the 
weakness of the term nationalism is that it is subject to “value-laden interpretations” 
(DeLamater, 1969, p. 320). The conceptualisations and operationalisations in this area 
may therefore reflect a tendency by academics to bifurcate what Billig (1995) referred 
to “our” patriotism from “their” nationalism. Such an embedded liberal bias in 
academic concepts and operationalisation can render these measures useless and lead 
to misunderstandings of conservative attitudes and behaviours.  
These observations are limited in that the Factor 1 and Factor 2 groups being 
compared were broadly, but not exclusively, comprised of participants identifying 
with the respective left or right, although the comparison could instead be understood 
to be between national identity types. Further work comparing purposely constructed 
ideological groups may be required to confirm these findings. In addition, and 
although the participant group in this study can in many ways be considered a 
strength—this study was able to tap into an older and wider geographic sample than 
many non-survey studies—the range of opinion might have been larger in a more 
diverse participant group in terms of socio-economic status, age and ethnicity.   
Conclusion 
Our findings suggest that in the current political environment, political 
ideology may underlie current operationalisations of patriotism and nationalism, 
therefore limiting the descriptive and predictive values of these measures. When 
participants considered eight of these conceptualisations together, they freely 
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constructed their American national identities along left and right ideological lines, 
with differing interpretations of patriotism conceptualisations as the most 
distinguishing feature. These findings extend and connect previous work on national 
identity, patriotism, nationalism, and ideology. 
This work has underscored the value of employing qualitative or mixed 
methodologies, and Q methodology in particular, to draw out distinctions not 
anticipated by a priori, quantitative measures. Insights gained into the subtleties of 
meaning espoused by the right and left may be used to better inform quantitative 
approaches to the assessment of political attitudes and behaviours. For example, 
measures that contrast understandings of the American Creed, or attachment to the 
nation in the abstract, hold possibilities for more refined analyses. Understanding that 
the political left and right may be more or less attached to different facets of the 
nation and that they are equally attached to others, should allow for more nuanced 
communication to both the in-group and the outgroup. And finally, appreciating that 
the ideological divide may not be simply down to a difference in particular political 
issues or the support for certain candidates, but in how citizens understand their 
American identity, their relationship to the nation and its people, allows for a more 
precise study of American national identity and its implications in a changing national 
society. 
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Figure 1. representation of Q-sort distribution similar to that used in this study  
 
  






















Note:  CC=civic creedal, CR=civic republican, EC=ethno-cultural, P=pride,  S=symbolic, Ch=chauvinism, 
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